An exploitable firmware update vulnerability exists in the NT9665X Chipset firmware running on the Anker Roav A1 Dashcam, version “RoavA1_SW_V1.9.” The HTTP server could allow an attacker to overwrite the root directory of the server, resulting in a denial of service. An attacker can send an HTTP POST request to trigger this vulnerability.
Anker Roav A1 Dashcam RoavA1_SW_V1.9
5.3 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
CWE-276: Incorrect Default Permissions
The Novatek NT9665X SOC is a chipset used in an large number of consumer camera devices, particularly in dashboard cameras. The chip provides default firmware that is a fork of the Embedded Configurable Operating System (eCOS) project, which is found within the Roav A1 Dashcam,the product we are focusing on in this advisory.
The Roav A1 Dashcam by Anker is a dashboard camera that allows users to connect using the Roav app for Android and iOS so that they can control the camera remotely. In order to do this, users must first enable the “Wi-Fi AP” setting manually on the dashcam, and then connect to the “Roav_A1_
From here, the app interacts mainly with the dashboard camera via an eCOS web server running on port 80 that requires no authentication. The standard HTTP POST, GET and DELETE requests can be used to upload, download or delete videos and pictures from the dashcam. While there is a mechanism in place for locking videos, such that crash footage is not able to be removed, it is still possible on the eCOS platform to overwrite directories with a file, resulting in video loss.
Even more severely, it is possible to send an HTTP request as such:
curl -x POST http://192.168.1.254//.
This results in the root directory of the web server being overwritten with a standard file that is not a directory. Additionally, the entire filesystem on the SD card disappears and all movie recording and picture taking is disabled until the device reboots. Upon reboot, the device automatically reformats the inserted SD card, as it cannot find the directories that it expects, deleting all previous recordings and snapshots.
While the loss of data is already severe, when this denial-of-service vulnerability is paired up with TALOS-2018-0699, the result is a total and complete disabling of the device — the device cannot be used at all until the battery runs out.
2018-10-29 - Talos contacts vendor
2018-11-02 - Report disclosed to vendor
2018-12-04 - 30 day follow up
2019-01-18 - 60 day follow up - Talos reaches out to TWNCERT for assistance reaching vendor (Novatek)>br> 2019-01-22 - TWNCERT contacted Novatek and advised Novatek will check emails for reports
2019-03-06 - 90+ day follow up - Talos asks TWNCERT for direct point of contact for Novatek
2019-03-27 - Talos sends follow up to TWNCERT
2019-04-02 - Talos sends copies of email correspondence and reports to TWNCERT
2019-04-18 - Suggested pubic disclosure date of 2019-05-13 (171 days after initial disclosure)
2019-04-19 - Vendor fixed issue and provided patch to their IDH
2019-05-13 - Public disclosure
Discovered by Lilith (<_<) of Cisco Talos.