Talos Vulnerability Report


LEADTOOLS CMP-parsing code execution vulnerability

November 5, 2019
CVE Number



An exploitable integer underflow vulnerability exists in the CMP-parsing functionality of LEADTOOLS 20. A specially crafted CMP image file can cause an integer underflow, potentially resulting in code execution. An attacker can specially craft a CMP image to trigger this vulnerability.

Tested Versions

LEADTOOLS 20.0.2019.3.15

Product URLs


CVSSv3 Score

8.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H


CWE-191: Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound)


LEADTOOLS, according to the website, “is a collection of comprehensive toolkits to integrate document, medical, multimedia, and imaging technologies into desktop, server, tablet, and mobile applications”. It offers prebuilt and portable libraries with an SDK for most platforms (Windows, Linux, Android, etc.), that are all geared toward building applications for medical systems.

The module used for this analysis is below:

Loaded symbol image file: lfCmpX.DLL
Mapped memory image file: C:\LEADTOOLS 20\Bin\CDLL\x64\lfCmpX.DLL
Image path: C:\LEADTOOLS 20\Bin\CDLL\x64\lfCmpX.DLL
Image name: lfCmpX.DLL
Timestamp:        Thu Feb 21 13:24:07 2019 (5C6EFAD7)
CheckSum:         00096660
ImageSize:        0009B000
File version:
Product version:
File flags:       0 (Mask 3F)
File OS:          40004 NT Win32
File type:        2.0 Dll
File date:        00000000.00000000
Translations:     0409.04e4

LEADTOOLS provides a proprietary image format called CMP which is used to potentially give smaller image sizes while maintaining higher image quality than other image formats.

The data in a CMP format has its top bit flipped. Before parsing this data, this bit is flipped back using the following bit-flipping method.

.text:000000000000A420  xor     byte ptr [rdx], 80h ; rdx points to image data
.text:000000000000A423  inc     rdx
.text:000000000000A426  dec     ecx
.text:000000000000A428  jnz     short loc_A420

In preparation for reading the file data, the amount of data, including the length field itself is read in via a two-byte memmove.

.text:000000000003B75C  mov     edi, [rsi+1404h]
.text:000000000003B762  mov     rdx, [rsi+13F8h] ; src -> points to two byte data size
.text:000000000003B769  mov     rcx, r12         ; dst -> stack location to hold the dat size
.text:000000000003B76C  cmp     ebp, edi
.text:000000000003B76E  cmovb   edi, ebp
.text:000000000003B771  mov     r8d, edi         ; size -> two bytes
.text:000000000003B774  mov     ebx, edi
.text:000000000003B776  call    memmove

The read in size is adjusted by two to remove the size bytes themselves. This calculated size is then passed to a memmove wrapper to copy data from the image into a larger CMP object.

.text:000000000003B7A7                 movzx   r8d, [rsp+98h+size_0]   ; size byte 0
.text:000000000003B7AD                 movzx   eax, [rsp+98h+size_1]   ; size byte 1
.text:000000000003B7B2                 mov     rdx, [rsi+0A130h]       ; image buffer
.text:000000000003B7B9                 shl     r8d, 8
.text:000000000003B7BD                 mov     rcx, rsi
.text:000000000003B7C0                 or      r8d, eax
.text:000000000003B7C3                 add     r8d, 0FFFFFFFEh         ; Subtract 2 for size bytes
.text:000000000003B7C7                 mov     [rsi+5F8h], r8d
.text:000000000003B7CE                 call    copies_data_post_header ; memmove wrapper

If an attacker sets the current data size field to 1, then the subtraction results in an integer underflow. This underflow will cause the memmove to write data outside the bounds of the input file heap buffer, resulting in a heap buffer overflow, potentially leading to code execution.s

Crash Information

First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
Time Travel Position: 194EF9:0
00007fff`22026862 488941f0        mov     qword ptr [rcx-10h],rax ds:00000204`eaa18000=????????????????

0:000> dx -g @$cursession.TTD.Utility.GetHeapAddress(@rcx-0x100)
=                            = Action   = Address          = Size       =
= [0x1e39] : [object Object] - Alloc    - 0x204eaa08000    - 0x10000    -


2019-09-10 - Vendor Disclosure
2019-11-03 - Vendor patched
2019-11-05 - Public Disclosure


Discovered by Cory Duplantis of Cisco Talos.